In May 2006, the McKinsey Global Institute published a 252-page analysis of the Swedish economy. One of the report's most frequently cited findings was that the "de facto" unemployment rate in Sweden in 2004 was between 15 and 17 percent, about three times higher than the official unemployment rate of 5.4 percent in that year (1, Exhibit 6) . Important media outlets such as the Financial Times (2) (3) (4) and The Economist (5) repeated the McKinsey estimate as part of critiques of recent Swedish economic performance. The Economist even went so far as to accuse Sweden of being "a world champion at massaging its jobless figures."
To arrive at its 15 to 17 percent "de facto" unemployment rate, McKinsey included what it viewed as "people who don't work, even though they should be able to" in the pool of the unemployed. These groups that McKinsey added to the unemployed included: "latent job candidates"; the "underemployed"; those "excluded from [the] labor force with ability to work"; and workers on government programs. Reasonable people could disagree with McKinsey concerning both its choices of the types and the numbers of individuals to include in its "de facto" unemployment calculation. The analysis here, however, accepts that McKinsey methodology and, instead, asks, What happens if we use the same methodology to estimate the "de facto" unemployment rate in the United States?
To calculate this, we added "discouraged workers," "marginally attached" workers, and part-timers for "economic reasons" (three official government categories), plus estimates of "early retirement" and the disabled population in the United States that could work, following McKinsey's methodology, plus a reasonable estimate of the share of the U.S. workforce that is in moderately subsidized jobs (through the Earned Income Tax Credit). The resulting "de facto" unemployment rate in the United States is 13.8 percent, compared with a 5.5 percent official U.S. unemployment rate, and an estimated 15.5 percent "de facto" Swedish unemployment rate. If we also include the two countries' prison and jail populations in the "de facto" unemployment rate-something in the spirit of the original McKinsey analysis, but not included in their original analysis-the "de facto" unemployment rate in the United States rises to 15.2 percent, just 0.5 percentage points lower than McKinsey's figure for Sweden including its prison and jail population (15.7%).
The unemployment rate is far from a perfect measure of economic wellbeing or national labor-market performance. To the extent that critics of the Swedish economy rely on the McKinsey Global Institute's estimates of the "de facto" unemployment in Sweden, however, those critics must also be sure to apply the same criteria to other countries serving as implicit or explicit points of comparison. For Sweden, the specific numbers in Table 1 differ slightly from those published by McKinsey. The small discrepancy appears to be related to the way that McKinsey converted its estimates of the additional "de facto" unemployed to a "de facto" unemployment rate. Typically, the unemployment rate is calculated as the total number of unemployed divided by the total labor force, where the labor force is defined as the total employed plus the total unemployed. The McKinsey calculation seems to add the "de facto" unemployed to the pool of unemployed in the numerator of the fraction used to calculate the unemployment rate, but to exclude the "de facto" unemployed from the total "de facto" labor force in the denominator of the fraction. For consistency, and ease of comparison with the United States, we use the standard definition of the unemployment rate and apply it to both Sweden and the United States, using McKinsey's published Real Unemployment Rates / 185 numbers for the "de facto" unemployed for Sweden and our own corresponding estimates for the United States.
DATA AND METHODS
The McKinsey methodology, and by extension the exercise here, deviates in an important way-not acknowledged in the McKinsey report-from the standard internationally accepted definition of unemployment. According to this standard "search-based" definition, unemployed workers must meet three criteria: (a) have worked for less than one hour during a reference period (usually one week); (b) be available for work (that is, not sick or on vacation, for example); and (c) have searched for work at least once during the reference period. The McKinsey approach makes the strong assumption that individuals "reassigned" from their current situation (a portion of people on disability insurance, for example) will all fit the three criteria for unemployment, including the search criteria. In reality, many of those "reassigned" from other activities to the McKinsey "unemployed" category would likely not engage in search and therefore would actually be classified as "not in the labor force" by the national statistical agency.
Official Unemployment Rate
The first line in Table 1 (A) gives the official unemployment rate in both countries, following the standard search-based definition of unemployment. In 2004, this benchmark unemployment rate in Sweden (5.3%) was basically identical to the corresponding unemployment rate in the United States (5.5%). The U.S. unemployment rate in the table is the official rate published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on its website (www.bls.gov/).
"Latent Job Candidates"
The first category of "de facto" unemployed workers that McKinsey adds to the Swedish unemployment rate is "latent job candidates," described as "persons that are included in 'not in the labor force' but that want to work and can start within 14 days, including full-time students who have applied for work" (1, Exhibit 6). McKinsey's estimate of 140,000 latent job candidates increases the "real" Swedish unemployment rate by 3.1 percentage points.
A roughly comparable group in the United States would include two categories of workers designated by the BLS: "discouraged workers" and "marginally attached workers." The BLS defines discouraged workers as "persons not in the labor force who want and are available for a job and who have looked for work sometime in the past 12 months (or since the end of their last job if they held one within the past 12 months), but who are not currently looking because they believe there are no jobs available or there are none for which they would qualify" (www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm). Marginally attached workers are "persons not in the labor force who want and are available for work, and who have looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months (or since the end of their last job if they held one within the past 12 months), but were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey." (The discouraged worker category is a subset of the marginally attached.) In 2004, about 2 million people in the United States were either "marginally attached" or discouraged workers. Counting them as "de facto" unemployed would raise the "real" unemployment rate 1.4 percentage points. The U.S. data in Table 1 (B) are taken from the BLS website; they are derived from the 2004 Current Population Survey (discouraged workers, series LNU05026645; marginally attached workers, series LNU05026642).
Underemployed
The second category of "de facto" unemployed is the underemployed. For Sweden, McKinsey defined the group as "persons with employment but working less than they would like to" (1, Exhibit 3). By McKinsey's estimate, about 132,000 Swedish workers were underemployed in 2004, which would have raised the "de facto" underemployment rate by 2.9 percentage points.
For the United States, Table 1 (C) shows the portion of part-time workers who say that they would like to work full-time but are not able to do so for "economic reasons" such as the unavailability of full-time work or reduced demand for hours at their current employer. In 2004, about 4,566,000 U.S. workers reported working only part-time hours for economic reasons. Following McKinsey, the table multiplies this figure by half (because the part-time workers were, on average, only missing "half" a job). The inclusion of these involuntary part-time workers as "de facto" unemployed would raise the unemployment rate 1.5 percentage points. The involuntary part-time data are taken from the BLS website (series LNS12032194).
"Excluded from Labor Force with Ability to Work"
McKinsey also includes as "de facto" unemployed those workers that it concludes have been excluded from the labor force but could, in fact, be working. This group is primarily "people who are on sick-leave or early retirement above and beyond the levels seen in around 1970" (1, p. 25) . According to McKinsey's calculations, about 215,000 Swedes fall in this category. Including this group in the pool of the unemployed would raise the overall unemployment rate 4.6 percentage points.
For the United States, Table 1 (D) presents estimates of the size of corresponding U.S. groups. To calculate "excess disability," the table compares the share of the total population aged 25 to 64 that received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSI DI) in 1970 (1.6%) with the share receiving SSI DI in 2004 (3.9%) and, following McKinsey, declares any SSI DI above the 1970 level as reflecting "excess" disability. Given the size of the population aged 25 to 64 in 2004, the calculation implies that about 3,561,000 formally disabled workers would be "able to work," raising the "de facto" unemployment rate 2.4 percentage points. SSI DI data are taken from Autor and Duggan (6, Fig. 1 ).
To calculate "excess early retirement," the table takes a different approach. Instead of using the 1970 employment rate for 55 to 64 year olds as a benchmark, it uses the 2004 employment rate for 55 to 64 year olds in Sweden. In 2004, despite McKinsey's concerns about excess early retirement in Sweden, the employment-to-population rate for 55 to 64 year olds (69.5%) was actually 9.6 percentage points higher in Sweden than in the United States (59.9%). The table therefore assumes that the United States in 2004 ought to be able to do at least as well as Sweden in 2004. McKinsey, of course, applies a stricter benchmark to Sweden, which was to do at least as well as Sweden around 1970, when employment rates for 55 to 64 year olds were higher than in 2004. Using contemporary Sweden as a benchmark, the McKinsey methodology applied to the United States suggests that the "de facto" unemployment rate, including "excess early retirement," would be about 1.8 percentage points higher than the official rate for that year. Using the employment-to-population rate in the United States in 1970 would have added only a negligible number of workers to the "de facto" unemployment rate. Employment-to-population rates for 55 to 64 year olds in Sweden and the United States are taken from the OECD (7 , Tables C and D) .
Government Programs
McKinsey does not define exactly which workers it includes in "government programs," but presumably these involve government-provided or governmentsubsidized jobs. McKinsey estimates that about 106,000 Swedes fall in this category. Counting this group as "de facto" unemployed would raise the unemployment rate 2.3 percentage points.
The United States also has a large program that subsidizes the wages of many low-wage workers: the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). In 2004, about 21.6 million tax filing units, which may include more than one worker per unit, reported receiving some income from the EITC (8) . An analysis of data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) indicates that among oneand two-adult households receiving income from the EITC about 25 percent received EITC payments equal to more than 15 percent of their income from work. Table 1 (E) assumes that recipients in these fairly heavily subsidized jobs could reasonably be considered "de facto" unemployed under the McKinsey criteria. Under these assumptions, the "de facto" unemployment rate would increase 3.5 percentage points.
Prison and Jail Population
The McKinsey report did not examine the effects of the prison and jail population on the "de facto" unemployment rate in Sweden, presumably because it would have had only a negligible effect. In fact, when we use data from the International Centre for Prison Studies on the Swedish prison population, under the assumption that all prisoners would count as "de facto" unemployed, the impact would be to raise the "real" unemployment rate only 0.2 percentage points. The U.S. prison and jail population, however, is much higher as a share of the population. Data from the same source put the comparable population in the United States in 2004 at about 2.1 million. Including these people as "de facto" unemployed would raise the unemployment rate 1.4 percentage points. For both Sweden and the United States, the prisoner populations are averages from the International Centre for Prison Studies sixth and seventh reports on prison populations (9, 10) .
CONCLUSION
The McKinsey Global Institute's estimates of the "de facto" unemployment rate in Sweden have received widespread attention, and have been used to put Sweden in an unfavorable light when compared with other economies. McKinsey's calculations of Sweden's "official" and "real" unemployment rates, however, don't make similar adjustments to other-implicit and explicitcomparison countries. If we apply the McKinsey methodology to the United States, the "de facto" U.S. unemployment rate rises from about 5.5 percent to 13.8 percent (compared with 15.5% in Sweden). If we also include the prison and jail populations in both countries, the gap between Sweden and the United States is even smaller: 15.2 percent for the United States, compared with 15.7 percent for Sweden. If the McKinsey numbers are evidence that the Swedish economy needs significant reform and restructuring, then these figures for the United States also suggest an urgent need for reform and restructuring here.
